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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Reese, Romer Facility: Fishkill CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 89-A-7760 
Appearances: Joseph Petito Esq. 
2 Austin Court 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12603 
10-074-18 B 
Decision appealed: September 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Berliner, Drake 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived March 25, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board R~port, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decisiori appealed is hereby: 
_ . Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separa!e fVJdings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on fitr>//9 bb . •. · / ' 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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     Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing an 18-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him stabbing his girlfriend to 
death.  Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the 
Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision 
illegally resentenced him. 3) the Board failed to make required findings of fact to support the 
statutory standard cited. 4)  the decision lacks detail. 5) the decision fails to provide any future 
guidance. 6) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 7)  the decision is due 
to bias against offenders whose victims are women. 8)  the Board failed to establish a guideline 
score as is required by 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8001.3.  9)  the process is defective, per comments from 
former Board Commissioner Manley. 10)  the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments 
to the Executive and with the current regulations, as no written procedures for risk and needs 
analysis exist, the COMPAS was ignored, the COMPAS departure doesn’t comply with the 
regulation, and the statutes are now rehabilitation/future focused. 11)  the 18 month hold is 
excessive. 
 
         Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
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     There is no requirement in the law that the board place equal or greater emphasis on petitioner's 
present commendable conduct than on the gravity of his offense.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).  
     The Board based its determination upon the serious nature of the crimes for which the petitioner 
was incarcerated and his prior criminal record, which are sufficient grounds to deny parole 
release.”  Matter of Scott v. Russi, 208 A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d. Dept. 1994). 
 
    The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 
21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 
30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765  (3d Dept. 2006). 
     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
    The Board may consider the inmate had displayed an escalation of unlawful activities. Stanley v 
New York State Division of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2d Dept. 2012). 
The Board may consider the inmate’s past history of violent behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v New 
York State Board of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept 1983); People ex rel. 
Henson v Miller, 244 A.D.2d 729, 664 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept 1997), leave to appeal denied 91 
N.Y.2d 809, 670 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1998); Vasquez v New York State Division of Parole, 215 
A.D.2d 856, 626 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dept 1995); Ward v New York State Division of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d Dept. 2016); Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 
502 (3d Dept. 2017); Allen v Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     The Board may take note of the inmate’s disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v 
Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). 
     The Board placing particular emphasis on the callous nature of the offense does not demonstrate 
irrationality bordering on impropriety. Olmosperez v Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3d 
Dept. 2014). 
    The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 
148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results 
including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 
A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
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A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
     That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
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resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
    An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest 
in parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); 
Matter of Motti v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 114, 115, 863 N.Y.S.2d 839, 839-40 (3d Dept. 2008); 
Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 
(3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     The guidelines regulation cited at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8001.3 was repealed in 2014. 
 
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Reese, Romer DIN: 89-A-7760  
Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.:  10-074-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 5 of 6) 
 
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State 
Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
    Claims revolving around a speech by former Commissioner Manley are without merit as his 
comments were not made under oath, and create no substantive rights. Matter of Alvarez v Evans, 
Index # 2804/2013, Decision and Order dated July 30, 2013 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Co.)(Brands, 
J.S.C.). Furthermore, Manley has not been on the Board in over a decade, and many of his concerns 
have been addressed by the enactment of 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.2.  And, the transcript reveals the 
Board did discuss all required issues, and the Board decision is adequately detailed. 
 
      A claim by a male inmate that the Parole Board Commissioners who voted against him were 
biased because  his crimes involved women as victims is pure speculation and will be denied. 
Marcelin v Travis, 262 A.D.2d 836, 693 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (3d Dept 1999). There is a presumption 
of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. People ex.rel. 
Johnson v New York State Board of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept 1992); 
Withrow v Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed2d 712 (1975). And, Courts presume the 
Parole Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. Garner 
v Jones, 529  U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1371, 146 L.Ed2d 236 (2000). There must be support in the 
record to prove the alleged bias, and proof that the outcome of the Board’s Release Decision flowed 
from the bias.  Hughes v Suffolk County Department of Civil Service, 74 N.Y.2d 833, 546 N.Y.S.2d 
335, motion to amend remittur granted 74 N.Y.2d 833, 550 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1989); Matter of Silmon 
v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 
N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Hernandez v McSherry,  271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 
(3d Dept 2000), lv. app. den. 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 
1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 2017). No legitimate offer of proof exists in this case.       
     Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. These 
regulations do constitute the written procedures.  
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     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 
2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase 
transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own 
regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 
1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     The Board did not depart from the COMPAS as it cited negative COMPAS scores in the decision. 
The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 
148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results 
including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 
A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
     Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal 
regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this 
proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest 
change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which 
governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The Board still must conduct a case-by-
case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 
866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department has “take[n] the unusual step of 
affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he 
Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight” and rejected 
any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning 
over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 
22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).   
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
